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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, Investigation Division

DATE: June 11, 1948

FROM : Chief, Contact Section

SUBJECT: Budget Requirements for the Fiscal Year July 1, 1949, through
June 30, 1950

There is set forth below the budgetary requirements for the Contact Section for the fiscal year July 1, 1949, through June 30, 1950:

1. This Section establishes, develops, and maintains liaison with appropriate governmental agencies and departments, and private sources for the purpose of securing investigative and personnel information for use in the investigation and security approval of applicants and employees of the Central Intelligence Agency. In addition similar liaison is accomplished for the Office of Special Operations, [REDACTED] in connection with the clearance of personnel and development of information for intelligence purposes. This Section also maintains liaison as outlined above in connection with both the present and proposed programs of the [REDACTED] Office of Special Operations. It is anticipated that the latter program will increase in scope as it becomes operative. Further, interviews of the following types are conducted by the Contact Section: (a) for the purpose of securing additional information prior to employment or the issuance of Security Approval; (b) exit interviews in connection with the clearance of personnel who are leaving the Central Intelligence Agency; and (c) interviews for the purpose of briefing personnel going on overseas trips, either on official or personal travel. This Section also receives and handles all requests for information of a security nature, relating to former personnel of the Office of Strategic Services, the Strategic Services Unit, and present and former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, from other government agencies and departments.

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2. In performing the activities of the Contact Section, it is necessary to coordinate the investigative functions of this office with those carried on in the Employee Investigative Service, as well as with the investigative functions under the direction of the [REDACTED] Office of Special Operations. In order to effectively accomplish the work of this Section, it is extremely important that there be no duplication in the handling of liaison activities between the individual investigative offices of the Central Intelligence Agency. In order to eliminate this eventuality, close coordination is, therefore, maintained as to the delimitation of functions of the individual

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investigative offices. In addition, in connection with the program of the [REDACTED], it is necessary to avoid instances of duplication of contacts with individuals in whom both the Office of Operations and the Office of Special Operations are interested. Control, therefore, is necessary over all cases handled in order to apprise the appropriate offices of such duplication.

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3. In order to effectively carry out the functions of Security, it is necessary that all available pertinent investigative material be obtained and in the most expeditious manner feasible. The performance of the functions of the Contact Section in Washington, D. C. has obviated the necessity of personal investigation throughout the country in many instances, thereby permitting the clearance of additional personnel. In addition, when preliminary inquiry by the Contact Section reveals the undesirability of an applicant or proposed contact, considerable time is saved by the termination of consideration of this individual, whereas a costly and time consuming investigation would otherwise be necessary. Perhaps the most effective function of this section is the service it provides in obtaining and developing information which would otherwise possibly not be secured. In the many instances where questionable and derogatory information has thus been secured, it appears that data has been obtained which would otherwise not have been available for consideration in the evaluation of the individual case.

It is anticipated that the functions and responsibilities of this Section will be materially increased during the fiscal year, in accordance with the expansion of the current program of the Contact Branch, Office of Operations.

4. During the period from June 1, 1947 through May 31, 1948, the following functions were performed in the Contact Section:



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Number of Investigative Reports Secured:

Partial	1555
Complete	269

Number of Interviews Conducted: 330

Number of Files Reviewed in Accordance with Requests for Security Information Received From Government Agencies and Departments:

Daily FBI Reviews	527
Other Agencies	179

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In order to handle the proposed increased functions of this Section in accordance with the current and proposed program of the Contacts Branch, Office of Operations, as well as the functions to be performed in connection with the Employee Investigative Service, the services of two additional Contact Officers and two stenographers will be required. The activities of the Contact Section for the past one and one-half years have been of sufficient volume to require frequent overtime work by the personnel, as well as a constant backlog of work. By the addition of the proposed personnel, it will be possible to maintain the functions of this Section on a current basis in order that the work of the [REDACTED] the Office of Special Operations, and the other offices serviced will be effectively and expeditiously performed.

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